AN ABSTRACT OF THE ESSAY OF Human Understanding.

D. Rochfort

By Mr. *LOCKE.*

Abridg'd by the late Lord Chief Baron *GILBERT.*

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IT *would be ſuperfluous to add any thing to recommend the following Abſtract of Mr.* LOCKE's *celebrated Eſſay on Human Underſtanding, after I have aſſured my Readers, that it was drawn up by no leſs a Man than the late Lord Chief Baron* GILBERT.

AN

ABSTRACT

OF THE

Eſſay of Human Underſtanding.

MEN come into the World without any idea or principle, either ſpeculative or practical; but all our ideas ariſe either from ſenſation or reflection.

An Idea is whatſoever is perceived or thought on; and is either,

Firſt, Simple.
Secondly, Complex.

A SIMPLE IDEA is one uniform appearance, repreſentation or precep-

tion of the mind, without alteration or variety. Here three things are to be conſidered:

1*ſt*, The manner of their conveyance, or being in the mind.

2*dly*, The objects from without that affect the mind.

3*dly*, The mind itſelf.

1*ſt*, The manner of their conveyance into the mind; and ſome ſimple Ideas come in by Senſation only, ſome by reflection only, ſome both by ſenſation and reflection.

(1.) By Senſation only: and theſe either by the ſenſation of one ſenſe, as light and colour by the eye, ſound by the ear, taſte by the palate, odours by the noſe; and the Ideas of ſolidity and other tangible qualities, as heat, cold, &c. by the touch; or of ſeveral ſenſes, as the Ideas of motion and reſt, ſpace, extenſion and figure.

(2.) By Reflection only, as perception or thinking, volition or willing, and their ſeveral modes.

(3.) Simple Ideas, both by ſenſation and reflection: and theſe are either pain, pleaſure, exiſtence, or unity.

2*dly*, Objects from without that affect the mind; and they are,

1. Primary qualities of bodies, ſuch as motion, reſt, figure, and texture, which are in the bodies themſelves, whether perceiv'd or not.

2. The ſeveral diſpoſitions in bodies to produce ſeveral ſenſations in us, whence colours, ſounds, taſtes, &c. which are indeed only ſenſations produced in the animal by the operation or action of ſuch primary qualities.

3*dly*, The Mind itſelf, and therein are three faculties.

1. Of *Perception*.

2. Of *Retention*, which is twofold.

(1.)

(1.) Either the keeping the ſame Ideas actually in view, which we call Contemplation.

(2.) Or reviving them when they are gone, which we call Memory.

3. Of *Diſcernment*, which contains a threefold power.

1. Of comparing the ſeveral Ideas, and on ſuch compariſon obſerving their reſemblances, which is call'd Wit; or obſerving their minuteſt differences, which is call'd Judgment.

2. The power of compounding our Ideas, which is, (1.) By carrying ſeveral ſimple Ideas into the ſame repreſentation: or, (2.) By the repetition of the ſame Idea, which is called Enlarging.

3. The power of Abſtracting, which is the ſeparating any Idea from the circumſtances of real exiſtence, as from time, place, and other concomitant Ideas.

Secondly,

Secondly, COMPLEX IDEAS conſiſt of ſeveral ſimple Ideas united in the ſame repreſentation, appearance or perception: and they either come into the mind thus united from the operation of things without us: as the Idea, ſolidity and figure, is caus'd by the ſame Ball, therefore in the complex Idea of the Ball, we conceive ſuch Ideas as co-exiſtent and concomitant; or elſe when ſuch ſimple Ideas are united by the mind, as in the Idea of Law, obligation, *&c.*

Complex Ideas are of three ſorts.

I. Of Modes.
II. Subſtances.
III. Relations.

I. Of Modes, which are again two fold:

1ſt. Simple.
2dly. Mixt.

1*st*, Simple Modes are the ſeveral different manners under which any ſimple Idea may appear to the mind: and theſe either come in,

[1.] By Senſation only, as the ſeveral modes of ſpace, a yard, a furlong, a mile; or ſet out by viſible marks and boundaries, as the ſeveral places of bodies, or the ſeveral modes of numbers, as a ſcore, a groſs, a dozen.

[2.] By Reflection only, as the ſeveral modes of thinking: which are either,

(1.) Without pain or pleaſure; or,
(2.) With it.

(1.) Without pain or pleaſure: And whoever obſerves his mind, will find a perpetual revolution of Ideas while he is awake. The ſtopping any of them, and conſidering it on all ſides, we call Attention; the letting the mind

mind run adrift, in the conſtant rotation of ideas and objects before us, is call'd Remiſſion: and there are in the mind conſtant degrees of Attention and Remiſſion, according to the different degrees of conſideration the mind employs concerning the objects before it.

(2.) The modes of thinking with pleaſure and pain, and theſe are called the Paſſions. The pleaſure we find in any Idea preſent and abſent, we call Love; the pleaſure we find in the thought of any future enjoyment that we think probable to affect us, we call Hope; the pleaſure we find upon the near approach of any pleaſure, of whoſe poſſeſſion we think our ſelves aſſured, we call Joy. Whatſoever does or is like to affect us with pleaſure, we call Good; the thought of pain, which any thing preſent or abſent is apt to produce

produce in us, we call Hatred or Averſion; the uneaſineſs we find upon the abſence of any thing that might affect us with pleaſure, we call Deſire; the uneaſineſs of mind upon a good loſt, which we might have longer enjoyed, we call Sorrow; the uneaſineſs of mind upon thought of future pain, we call Fear; the uneaſineſs of mind on the thought of a good we deſire, obtained by another, we call Envy; if ſuch good relates to the enjoyment of men and women, it is called Jealouſy; a ſudden uneaſineſs of mind on a ſudden pain produc'd in us by another, together with a certain purpoſe to produce pain in return, is called Anger; if conſtant, and the purpoſe of returning pain be continuing, it is called Malice; the uneaſineſs that arrives from the thought of any unattainable good, we call Deſpair; whatſoever cauſes pain,

pain, or is like to produce it in us, is called Bad or Evil.

[3.] Simple modes coming in by Senſation and Reflection; Hence we have the Ideas,

1*ſt*, Of Power.
2*dly*, Of Time.
3*dly*, Of Eternity.
4*thly*, Of Infinity.

1. The Idea of Power: which is formed from the ability that we find in our ſelves of ſtopping any Idea in the revolution of any Ideas within us; or the power, by a thought, of moving our bodies, which is called the Will; the power of acting, or not acting, according to ſuch determination of a man's own thought, is called Liberty: So that liberty is the abſence of all impediments that hinder acting

acting or not acting, according to the preference of his own will. That which moves the will is uneaſineſs; but ſuch motions may be controul'd by the power we have within us of omitting any action, till we have conſidered its conſequences, and find them either good or evil. That wherein conſiſts innocence, is the acting or not acting, according as the judgment, upon a due and impartial conſideration, doth find ſuch act or omiſſion to be good or evil: and the not ſuſpending ſuch action till we have conſidered it as we might do, is called Guilt.

The Idea of power from ſenſation is, when there is any alteration in our ſimple ideas, by the action of bodies one upon another; that body, which makes the alteration, we conceive to have the power of making it, and the other a power of receiving it.

2. Of

2. Of Time, which is a certain revolution of Ideas in our own mind, meaſur'd by the motion of things without, and chiefly by the motion of the heavenly bodies, as being more conſtant than equal.

3. Eternity is the repetition of ſuch ſeveral revolutions, together with a reflection on our own power to add on, without coming to an end.

4. Infinity is the ſame repetition of our Ideas of ſpace or number, with a reflection on our power to add on, without coming to an end; and ſuch repetition of our Idea of Space, is by a peculiar name called Immenſity.

2*dly*, Of mixt Modes, which are ſeveral diſtinct ſimple Ideas united into the ſame Combination by the mind, and are therefore called Notions, as a lie, obligation, law, *&c.* And theſe the mind unites for greater diſpatch

in

in the buſineſs of civil life; and therefore only conſiders the poſſible union of ſuch ſimple Ideas, whether it has ever ſeen them ſo actually united or not.

II. The Ideas of Subſtances: and theſe are either,

1. Separate; or,
2. Collective.

(1.) Separate Subſtances, and that is the union or co-exiſtence of ſeveral ſimple Ideas in one and the ſame place, which is all the notion we have of ſubſtance: Thus the union of the Idea of extenſion, ſolidity, figure, and a diſpoſition to produce the idea of colour in us, is what we call *Body*. The union or co-exiſtence of the Ideas of perception, reflecting, chuſing, and ſelf-motion, is what we call Spirit: But what are the *Subſtrata* of theſe pro-

properties and powers, are to us equally unintelligible.

(2.) The collective Ideas of ſubſtances, which is when ſeveral ſubſtances are collected into the ſame repreſentation, as an army, triumph, proceſſion, &c.

III. Of relations, which is the comparing of ſeveral Ideas, whether ſimple, or of modes and ſubſtances, one with the other; and conſidering the denominations that may ariſe from ſuch compariſon: for ſince the order of nature is ſuch, that there is a dependence of things one upon the other, ſo do they convey to the mind an Idea of ſuch dependence: and whatever notion we have from ſuch dependence of things one on the other, or of the connection or repugnances of Ideas one to the other, gives us the Idea of relation.

All

All words that refer to a certain ſtandard, either of duration or ſize, are relative terms, as old, young, ſtrong, weak, &c. which relate to the uſual duration or conſtitution of each living creature, as the ſtandard to which we compare the thing mentioned. The moſt noted relations are theſe:

Firſt, Of Cauſe and Effect.
Secondly, Identity and Diverſity.
Thirdly, Moral Relations.
Fourthly, The Relations of our Ideas themſelves.

1*ſt*, Of Cauſe and Effect: That which produces any ſimple Idea in us, we call Cauſe; and that which is produced, we call the Effect.

2*ly*, Of Identity and Diverſity. And here the Identity of bodies ariſes from the Sameneſs of the parts, which produce

duce the ſame ſimple Ideas in the beholder. The Identity of vegetables ariſes from the ſame organization of the parts, whether exactly conſiſting of the ſame matter or not. Identity of animals conſiſts in the ſame organization of parts, and the ſame conſtant and continued common life; and that life conſiſts in the ſame faculties and power of acting. And the identity of perſon, mind or ſpirit conſiſts, as far as we can apprehend it, in having the ſame conſciouſneſs of Ideas, powers, and actions.

3*dly*, Of moral Relations: The notion of which ariſes from our comparing our actions to a rule; and that is threefold.

1. The laws of the country.

2. The laws of opinion or reputation.

3. The law of God, which is two-fold.

(1.) The law of nature, which is the rule which reaſon diſcovers to us touching the fitneſs or conveniency of any action.

(2.) The law reveal'd.

4thly, The relations of our Ideas themſelves: and they relate either,

1: To the perception of our own minds; or,

2. To the things they are ſuppos'd to repreſent.

3. Of the caſual relations of ſuch Ideas one to another, obtain'd in the mind.

1*ſt*. Of Ideas relating to the perception of our own mind: and they are ſaid to be either,

1. Clear;

1. Clear; or,
2. Confus'd.

(1.) A clear Idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all others.

(2.) A confuſed Idea is ſuch as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from other Ideas different from it.

2dly. Of Ideas relating to things they are ſuppoſed to repreſent; and they are,

1. Real or fantaſtical.
2. Adequate and inadequate.
3. True and falſe.

(1.) Of real or fantaſtical Ideas. All our ſimple Ideas are real, being produced by the operation of things in us. Mixt modes are all real, being a combination made by the mind; if the co-exiſtence of ſuch Ideas be only

poſſible. The Ideas of Subſtances are real, if we have ever found ſuch ſimple Ideas come into our mind ſo united; if otherwiſe, they are fantaſtical.

(2.) Of adequate and inadequate Ideas. Adequate Ideas are ſuch as perfectly repreſent thoſe archetypes or patterns to which the mind refers. Inadequate Ideas are a partial and incompleat repreſentation of ſuch patterns. All ſimple Ideas are adequate. All mixt modes are adequate, becauſe they refer to no archetypes or patterns, but only to a certain combination made by the mind: But ſo far they may be inadequate as they refer to a ſuppos'd combination, made in the minds of other perſons, ſignify'd under the ſame Name. All Ideas of ſubſtances are inadequate, becauſe they have reference to patterns, whoſe real eſſence we know not.

3.) Of

(3.) Of true and falſe Ideas. Ideas are ſaid to be true, that are conformable to ſome real exiſtence; and falſe, that have no conformity to ſuch exiſtence any where found: And ſo our Ideas are ſaid to be true, when they are conformable to the Ideas ſignify'd under the ſame name by others.

3dly. Of caſual relations of ſuch Ideas one to another, obtain'd in the mind. And this is by cuſtom. As the putting together of Ideas, according to their apparent or probable agreement or diſagreement, is reaſoning; and the connecting repugnant Ideas, is madneſs; ſo the connecting independent Ideas by cuſtom, which have no viſible connection in themſelves, is an infirmity in the mind that wants a name; as where a Man has the imagination of an infallible man by Education and cuſtom; theſe and ſuch-like

falſe

falſe aſſociations of Ideas by habit and cuſtom, make a perpetual connection between them in the mind; ſo that they perpetually appear together in the ſame gang, and as much affect our reaſonings, opinions and Judgment, as if they were naturally united.

Of LANGUAGE.

Men were not created to live ſolitary, and independently on each other, as ſeveral kinds of Brutes do, but for mutual intercourſe and ſociety; and therefore it was not enough for nature to furniſh the mind with objects from without, which are inviſible in the mind, but it was alſo neceſſary that we ſhould be furniſh'd with a ready method of communicating ſuch Ideas; and this was by the ſenſe of hearing, whereby we are capable of receiving ſe-

ſeveral ſounds, and connecting of them with the Ideas in the mind, and farther are by the tongue capable of making ſuch ſounds as ſigns of ſuch Ideas; So that Language is nothing elſe but the connection of ſounds to Ideas, in order to make the Ideas in the mind of one man underſtood by another. But becauſe ſeveral objects excite in us the ſame Ideas, therefore names in language are made general, to excite in the hearer ſuch an Idea as is framed in the mind of the ſpeaker, from whatſoever particular object ſuch Idea was formed in the mind of the ſpeaker; for in connecting the ſound of the Idea, the mind hath no farther conſideration than of the Idea it ſelf, as it ſtands in the mind of the ſpeaker, by whatſoever thing from without it was formed in him: And were it otherwiſe, it were impoſſible to regiſter the particu-

lari-

larity of things, and accommodate names to them, ſince ſcarce any Man hath the ſame Idea from the ſame particular object, which another has. Beſides that, if names were as particular as things, ſuch ſigns would become altogether uſeleſs; ſince the particularity of things are infinite, and therefore would incumber the mind with infinite names which could not be remembred, nor would be of uſe for intercourſe and communication.

In language four things are conſiderable:

Firſt, The expreſſion of independent Ideas.

Secondly, The expreſſion of the connection and repugnancy of Ideas.

Thirdly, The imperfections of language.

Fourthly, The abuſe of it.

1ſt. Of the expreſſion of independent Ideas, and that is threefold:

1. Of

1. Of ſimple Ideas.
2. The names of mixt modes.
3. The names of ſubſtances.

(1.) Of ſimple Ideas, which cannot be defined or explained *per notiora*, ſince definition is reſolving the thing to be defined into its moſt ſimple Ideas; but complex Ideas may be defined, becauſe they may be reſolved into their ſimple Ideas; and ſimple modes may be defined, being the manner in which theſe ſimple Ideas are combined; and therefore the mind may define ſuch preciſe combination.

(2.) The names of mixt modes; and they being arbitrarily made in the mind, for the ends of civil life, and names added to them for diſpatch in converſation, we may define the particular combination of which they conſiſt; and being made without any relation to archetypes without, it is the name

name that holds together the combination.

(3.) The names of ſubſtances; and here the name ſtands for the preciſe collection of ſimple Ideas in the mind of the ſpeaker, which is the nominal eſſence tho' it has a relation to ſomething without, capable of raiſing that preciſe collection of Ideas in the mind, which are the patterns or archetypes of ſuch nominal eſſence; but the real eſſence, which is the internal conſtitution of parts, on which ſuch properties depend, is perfectly unknown, and therefore not expreſt in the name.

2dly, The expreſſion of the connection and repugnancy of Ideas; and this is three ways.

1. By inventing words of affirmation and negation, to be ſigns of the expreſſion of ſuch connection and repugnancy.

2. By the invention of abſtract and concrete terms. The

The abſtract term or ſubſtantive, is the ſign of an Idea independent on any other.

The concrete Term or adjective, is the expreſſion of the Idea, with the relation of its co-exiſtence with others.

3. By the invention of particles, which are ſigns that connect the train of Ideas one to another, that they may be received into the mind of the hearer in the ſame order in which they ſtand in the mind of the ſpeaker.

3dly. Of the imperfection of language. And here,

1. Of ſimple Ideas; and there the Connection is made between the Name and the Idea, by ſhewing the object which exhibits it; and therefore here we are not very liable to miſtake, ſince theſe Ideas are regularly produced from things without, and therefore the ſame Ideas are formed in all men, having

ing the ſame organs; and there is no difference between the Archetypes and the Idea, the objects without regularly creating that Idea in the animal, to which the name is annext.

2. The names of mixt modes are often ſubject to perplexity and confuſion, when there is great variety in the ſame combination; ſo that the ſimple Ideas, of which the name conſiſts, cannot be remembred, and becauſe we cannot go to archetypes to correct their miſtakes about them.

3. The names of ſubſtances are liable to great imperfections, becauſe we know not the real conſtitution of things; and therefore cannot underſtand what preciſe combination of ſimple Ideas is co-exiſtent, which have all the ſame right to be made a part of the nominal eſſence.

4thly. The abuſe of words.

1. By

1. By uſing words without Ideas.

2. By varying the combination of Ideas, and keeping the ſame name; by referring words to the reality of things, and not to our own Ideas; by putting together ſuch Ideas in our minds as united in things without us, as have not come in co-exiſtent.

The remedy of theſe abuſes is, by defining the preciſe combination of Ideas to which the name is annext, and uſing the Words invariably for the ſame combination of Ideas.

Having thus conſidered our Ideas, which are the materials of our knowledge and our language, which is the manner of our conveying them to others: The laſt thing is to conſider how our Ideas are put together, and compared one with the other. And herein,

Firſt, Of knowledge and opinion.

Secondly, Of reaſon and error.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Of faith and enthuſiaſm.

Firſt. Of knowledge. Knowledge is the comparing of two or more Ideas, and viewing their connection and agreement, repugnancy or diſagreement, and it is twofold.

1. Either intuitive; or,
2. Demonſtrative.

(2.) Intuitive knowledge is where the agreement or repugnancy of ſeveral Ideas appears upon view.

(2.) Demonſtrative knowledge is where the agreement or repugnancy of Ideas doth not appear upon view, but by compariſon with ſome intermediate Idea. Thus we demonſtrate that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right, by ſetting the triangle between parallels, and comparing the angles at the upper point of inter-

interſection with the angles of the tri-angle, and two right angles.

The agreement or diſagreement of our Ideas, is of four ſorts.

Firſt, Of Identity or diverſity.
Secondly, Relation.
Thirdly, Co-exiſtence.
Fourthly, Real exiſtence.

1. Identity or diverſity is known by intuition, as we know by view that one colour or magnitude is not another.

2. The Ideas of *relation* are known from view or demonſtration, as in the inſtance beforementioned.

3. Co-exiſtence or non-co-exiſtence is ſeldom known from the general compariſon of our Ideas; for ſince we don't know the real ſubſtances of things, we don't know what Ideas are com-

compitable with each other: and therefore here we have no knowledge from the general conſideration of our Ideas, but from trial, obſervation and experience only.

4. Real exiſtence; and here we have knowledge,

(1.) Of our ſelves, by intuition or view.

(2.) Of the being of a God, by demonſtration; as thus: The abſence of being cannot produce being; *ergo*, ſomething eternal. Abſence of thought cannot produce thought: We think; *ergo*, there is thought without beginning. Eternal thought we call God. We begin to think; *ergo*, not from matter, where there is no thought; *ergo*, the mind created by eternal thought. And what ever could produce a being to ſee and feel, muſt be preſum'd, as a leſs effect of his power,

to

to produce the things felt and visible.

(3.) We have the knowledge of the being of all other things by sensation.

Having thus considered the objects of our knowledge, the next things to be considered are,

First, The extent.

Secondly, The reality. And,

Thirdly, The universality of our knowledge.

1st. The extent of our knowledge; and that is,

1. No farther than we have Ideas. And,

2. No farther than we can find their agreement or disagreement, by the comparing them with intermediate Ideas, by which their agreement or disagreement may appear.

2dly, The reality of our knowledge. And tho' our knowledge be only of Ideas, yet theſe Ideas having relation to objects without us, it is in ſome meaſure real; for all ſimple modes being the product of the operation of things themſelves upon our own minds, all our knowledge about them muſt be real knowledge. Mixt modes are intended to have relation to Ideas in our own minds, and therefore our knowledge concerning them has no other reality, but upon the ſuppoſition of the exiſtence of ſuch modes, conformable to our Ideas. Our knowledge of ſubſtances are ſo far real, as we put together Ideas co-exiſtent in the ſame place, and that have come into our minds thus united: but as far as we refer them to the real internal conſtitution of things, ſo far our Ideas of ſubſtances are not real, becauſe their conſtitutions

ſtitutions are unknown to us. Truth therefore in the mind is the inward perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our Ideas, together with a like perception of the paſt, preſent, or future exiſtence of the things themſelves ſo conjoined or ſeparated in Nature. In this definition of truth is comprehended a twofold certainty: A certainty of knowledge, which is the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our own Ideas: A certainty of exiſtence, which is a perception of the things themſelves exiſting, conjoin'd or ſeparate, as we have put them together; Truth in words is the conjoining the ſigns of the Ideas together, as the Ideas themſelves lie in the mind of the ſpeaker.

3dly, Of the univerſality of our knowledge. In ſimple Ideas, where the real and nominal eſſence is the ſame,

there all our knowledge is general and univerſal, becauſe there is no difference in theſe Ideas, from whatſoever objects they are formed. In mixt modes our knowledge is general and univerſal : for theſe being combinations made by the mind, not with relation to an actual, but only a poſſible exiſtence, all our knowledge concerning them is univerſal ; ſince the ſame agreement or diſagreement muſt happen where-ever they are found.

Our knowledge of ſubſtances, as far as relates to their real eſſence, is all particular, ſince it goes no farther than our trial and obſervation, which is only particular touching the bodies before us ; but not knowing the real and internal conſtitution of things, we cannot rank them into any general ſorts, or claſſes, under general names, and therefore we are not capable of any

univerſal

univerſal knowledge about them. For to make univerſal propoſitions, it is neceſſary that we ſhould know the abſolute ſet bounds of each particular thing that we comprehend under that general name; and that we cannot know without looking into the internal conſtitution of things, which in this ſtate and condition we cannot do: But touching the nominal eſſence of ſubſtances, we may make univerſal propoſitions; but theſe are only identical and trifling, and ſignify no more than the ſeveral Ideas we comprehend under that name: as when we ſay gold is yellow, fuſible, fixt, &c. That the whole is equal to all its parts taken together; as that whatſoever is, is; and that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be. Theſe three laſt, however they have got the reputation of maxims, are nothing

elſe

elſe but identical propoſitions, including what we comprehend under the name of whole or being, as the other comprehends what we include in the name or term of gold; by conſequence ſuch maxims are of little uſe to the invention of knowledge, but may ſerve for conviction of ſuch as effectually wrangle or oppoſe.

Secondly, Opinion is the perception of the probable agreement or diſagreement of our Ideas. Probability is where the connection or agreement, or the repugnancy or diſagreement is not found from the intuition or view of the Ideas themſelves, or from the intuition of any Idea to which they are compared, which by ſuch intermediate view ſhews ſuch connection or repugnancy; but ſuch agreement or diſagreement is found by obſervation and experience only, which could not

not be found from any view or juxtapoſition of the Ideas themſelves in our minds: Thus we know that our meat nouriſhes, not from any general Ideas of the internal conſtitution of meat, and of the animal, but becauſe we have found it to be true from experience only. But here we muſt conſider,

1ſt. The ſeveral criterions or marks of probability ariſing from our own experience.

2dly. From the experience of others.

1. The ſeveral criterions or marks of probability ariſing from our own experience.

(1.) When ſuch experience is general and univerſal, we no more doubt of ſuch truths than of thoſe that appear from the intuition of the Ideas themſelves, becauſe ſuch experience furniſhes the mind with a conſtant percep-

perception of the agreement or diſagreement of ſuch Ideas, as if it had riſen from the intuition of the Ideas themſelves.

(2.) If ſuch experience hath fail'd in ſingle inſtances, then the agreement or diſagreement of ſuch Ideas is judged from the number of ſuch inſtances, one way or the other, that have fallen under our experience; for then we eſteem ſuch Ideas to agree or diſagree one with the other, as we have generally found to do ſo: but every inſtance to the contrary, is the occaſion of ſome doubt to the mind.

Hence it is, that what may ſeem probable to one man, or in ſome places, ſeems improbable in others, according to the difference of their obſervation and experience: As that water ſhould be hard enough in winter to bear carts and horſes, may ſeem

probable

probable in *England* and *Holland*; but would not ſeem probable under the line where they were never uſed to ſuch obſervations.

All our knowledge touching ſubſtances goes no farther than probability, becauſe we have no Ideas of the internal conſtitution of ſuch ſubſtances to compare with each other; and therefore our reaſonings, touching the co-exiſtence or Non-co-exiſtence of ſuch Ideas, is founded,

1. Upon the trial and experience of ſuch their co-exiſtence.

2. Upon analogy; whereby, upon the obſervation of the co-exiſtence of like Ideas, we judge that where ſuch like Ideas are found, there will follow the ſame Ideas, which at other times we have found conſequent upon them.

2dly. The ſeveral criterions or marks of probability ariſing from the experience of others.

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As we judge by our own experience, ſo alſo we judge by the ſight, obſervation and experience of others; and this is called teſtimony. And in this eight things are conſiderable.

1. The number:
2. The Integrity:
3. The skill of the witneſſes.
4. Their true deſign and intent.

5. The conſiſtency of the parts and circumſtances of the relation.
6. Contrary teſtimonies.
7. The conſiſtence of what is atteſted with our own obſervation and experience. And,
8. The diſtance of ſuch relators from the ſight and view of the thing which they atteſt; which is ſo far weakened as they themſelves take it from others, and the thing related

doth

doth not fall under their own view or experience.

Theſe are the criterions of probability, touching facts depending on mere human agents: but on things depending on the power of God, the ſeventh criterion of probability is not to be taken into our weighing and conſidering ſuch facts; becauſe our obſervation and experience extends no farther than the ordinary courſe of nature, and not to what God almighty can do in an extraordinary manner, for the confirmation of doctrines of great importance, and which he hath thought fit to reveal.

Thirdly. Of reaſon, which is that faculty in men, whereby we diſcover the connection or repugnancy of our Ideas in themſelves, or their probable connection or repugnancy one to the other.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, Error ariſes from the caſual aſſociation of Ideas, by habit or cuſtom, or by education from our minority, otherwiſe than ſuch Ideas are conjoined or ſeparated in nature, or by depending blindly on the authority of others, without perceiving the connection of ſuch our Ideas, or the probable connection of them; and yet conjoining and ſeparating them according to ſuch authority, where there is no connection or repugnance in the Ideas themſelves; forming propoſitions in things of which we have no Idea, by compariſon of them with the Ideas we have; concluding without intermediate proofs, or without ſufficient conſideration of them.

Fifthly, Of faith. Faith is the belief of any truth coming from God the author of truth: and this is either,

1ſt. By original revelation. Or,

2dly. Traditional.

1. Original revelation is the immediate delivery of truth from God almighty into the minds of men, which is done in a manner to us unconceivable; for how God almighty may deliver himſelf in ways different from the common conveyance of knowledge, by ſenſation or reflection, is not by us to be underſtood, we having no other ways of knowledge; but that it may be done, is extremely probable, from the conſideration of his infinite power.

2. Traditional revelation is the belief of a truth coming from God, without immediate revelation to our ſelves upon the teſtimony of facts, which muſt of neceſſity proceed from the power of God.

(1.) Such things revealed cannot be contrary to reaſon, becauſe it were abſurd to ſuppoſe that God almighty ſhould dictate one thing in the ordinary

ry courſe of nature, and another by ſuch extraordinary revelation; nor could ſuch a revelation be believed, ſince the truth of its coming from God could not be more evident, than the connection or repugnance of the Ideas themſelves are in their own nature.

(2.) Such revelation is of things above reaſon; that is, of ſuch things of which reaſon is altogether ſilent: for ſuch revelation were to no purpoſe, if it taught nothing at all farther than what might be found by the uſe of our natural faculties; tho' it may inforce ſuch things as are found to be truths by our natural faculties from Conſiderations which could never be found out by them; and as far as it doth ſo, it is above and beyond what reaſon teaches.

Sixthly, Enthuſiaſm is an opinion that our own fancies and imaginations are revelations from God. And here,

1ſt. If ſuch perſon cannot, by extraordinary effects coming from God, give

give credit to ſuch pretended revelations, all men are left at liberty whether they will believe him or not.

2dly. If ſuch revelation be contrary to reaſon, or contrary to former revelations, atteſted by facts coming from God, ſuch revelation cannot be from God, becauſe God cannot be the author of contradictions.

3dly. If ſuch pretended revelation contain nothing more than what reaſon teaches, or what has been already taught by a former revelation, atteſted by the divine power, then ſuch revelation cannot be from God, unleſs it be atteſted by facts flowing from the ſame power: ſince we cannot ſuppoſe that to be done by God in a worſe and leſs evident manner, which hath been done in a better and more apparent manner already.

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